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   NOTE 
 
Redefining “Amend”: For the “Better” of 
Whom? 
Trustees of Clayton Terrace Subdivision v. 6 Clayton Terrace, LLC, 585 S.W.3d 
269 (Mo. 2019) (en banc) 
Clayton A. Voss* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Trustees of Clayton Terrace Subdivision v. 6 Clayton Terrace, 
LLC, the Supreme Court of Missouri overturned eighty years of legal 
precedent regarding the ability of homeowners to amend residential 
subdivision agreements to place further burdens on the use of real 
property.1  The court established that subdivisions can now increase the 
burdens on their lot owners, provided that the minimum number of owners, 
as required by the amendment provision in the subdivision indentures, 
support the new restriction.2  The court’s holding signifies a shift away 
from the traditional principle that a covenant authorizing a requisite 
majority of owners to “amend” or “modify” a residential subdivision’s set 
of restrictions does not permit the adoption of new burdens.3  It thus 
undermines Missouri’s policy of promoting “the free use of property 
unless property owners have voluntarily and unambiguously surrendered 
 
* B.S.Acc & M.Acc, University of Missouri–Columbia, 2019; J.D. Candidate, 
University of Missouri School of Law, 2022; Associate Member & Lead Articles 
Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2020–2021.  I am grateful to Professor R. Wilson 
Freyermuth for his insight and guidance during the writing of this Note, as well as the 
Missouri Law Review for its help in the editing process. 
 1. 585 S.W.3d 269, 282 (Mo. 2019) (en banc) [hereinafter Clayton Terrace] 
(“Van Deusen, for this reason, should be limited to its own facts, and has no persuasive 
– let alone binding – force under the present facts or in cases using different 
language.”) (citing Van Deusen v. Ruth, 125 S.W.2d 1, 2–3 (Mo. 1938). 
 2. See Clayton Terrace, 585 S.W.3d at 282. 
 3. This principle has been enforced in a number of appellate court decisions 
since Van Deusen.  125 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1938).  See, e.g., Jones v. Ladriere, 108 S.W.3d 
736, 739–40 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003); Webb v. Mullikin, 142 S.W.3d 822, 827 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2004); Bumm v. Olde Ivy Dev., LLC, 142 S.W.3d 895, 904 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004); 
Hazelbaker v. Cnty. of St. Charles, 235 S.W.3d 598 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007). 
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their rights.”4  By allowing “amend” to mean “add,” the court has opened 
the door to homeowners’ associations imposing additional prohibitions on 
a lot owner’s use of property; this should be a cause for concern in a state 
that has staunchly protected “the free and untrammeled use of real 
property.” 5 
Part II of this Note outlines the facts that led to the dispute in Trustees 
of Clayton Terrace and the court’s holding.  Part III examines Missouri’s 
well-established case law holding that amending restrictive covenants to 
include additional burdens on the use of real property requires unanimous 
consent from all affected property owners.  Part IV summarizes the court’s 
holding in Trustees of Clayton Terrace and explains the reasoning behind 
its departure from earlier case law.  Finally, Part V discusses the potential 
ramifications of the Supreme Court of Missouri’s decision to allow the 
imposition of additional restrictions on subdivision lot owners with less 
than unanimous approval and argues that the court may have been quick 
to dismiss Missouri’s longstanding precedent.  
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
In Trustees of Clayton Terrace, a dispute arose after the Trustees of 
Clayton Terrace Subdivision (“Trustees”) sought to enforce a “one 
residence per lot” restriction included in the amended subdivision 
indentures to prevent a developer, 6 Clayton Terrace, LLC, from splitting 
Lot 6 into two separate lots.6 
Clayton Terrace Subdivision (“Subdivision”), a residential 
subdivision in Frontenac, Missouri, was established by plat in 1923.7  The 
Subdivision was subject to the original indentures recorded with the plat, 
which provided for the election of subdivision trustees.8  The Trustees 
owed a fiduciary duty to the lot owners and had “the power to enforce the 
restrictions” included in the indentures.9  The indentures stated the 
restrictions would be “in force and binding upon the owners of this 
Subdivision for a period of twenty-five years from date of this instrument, 
unless amended or extended by two-thirds of the lot owners in this 
Subdivision and publicly recorded.”10  In 1928, the Subdivision adopted 
 
 4. Clayton Terrace, 585 S.W.3d at 288 (Powell, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 5. Id. at 287 (quoting Steve Vogli & Co. v. Lane, 405 S.W.2d 885, 889 (Mo. 
1966)). 
 6. Id. (majority opinion). 
 7. Id. at 273. 
 8. Id. at 273–74. 
 9. Id. at 274. 
 10. Id. at 273. 
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an amendment, which provided that “only one residence shall be erected 
on each lot.”11 
The Subdivision had twenty-two residential lots, among them a 2.3-
acre property referred to as Lot 6.12  Jane Huey lived in a house on Lot 6 
until she died on October 15, 2011, at which point her daughter, Jeanette 
Huey, as trustee of her mother’s trust, assumed responsibility for the lot.13  
In September 2012, Ms. Huey listed Lot 6 with a realtor, and in January 
2013, she agreed to sale terms with Century Renovations, LLC (“Century 
Renovations”).14  Century Renovations planned to acquire Lot 6 to lease it 
to developer Kevin McGowan, until McGowan could secure the funding 
necessary to purchase it from Century Renovations.15  McGowan was a 
career real estate developer who intended to split Lot 6 into two lots.16  On 
the day before closing, Century Renovations established 6 Clayton 
Terrace, LLC (“6 Clayton Terrace”) and assigned it the sale contract for 
Lot 6.17  Ms. Huey sold Lot 6 to 6 Clayton Terrace on February 15, 2013.18 
After the sale, McGowan leased the home on Lot 6, moved in with 
his children, and made substantial renovations to the house.19  While 
neither McGowan nor 6 Clayton Terrace  formally notified the Trustees of 
their intent to split the lot, 6 Clayton Terrace provided evidence that 
McGowan’s nine-year old son told a Subdivision resident about the plan 
after closing, who then relayed the information to the Trustees.20  The 
Trustees were concerned about the potential subdivision of Lot 6, but they 
 
 11. Id. Since 1923, the restrictions included in the original indentures have been 
amended, extended, and renewed five times by two-thirds vote, including the 1928 
amendment. Id. at 273–74. 
 12. Id. at 273; The Subdivision originally had twenty-three recorded lots in 1923 
before portions of certain lots were eliminated for the construction of a highway access 
ramp, and the remaining lots were reconfigured into 22 lots. Id. at 273 n.1. 
 13. Id. at 273–74. 
 14. Id. at 274. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 274–75. These changes would have been evident to anyone living near 
or passing by the home. They included: a) the demolition and removal of certain walls; 
b) combining the former kitchen and dining room into a single kitchen space which, 
as of the date of trial, remained in an unfinished condition; c) reconfiguring the layout 
of the upstairs so as to increase the number of bedrooms; d) raising the floor in the 
sunroom; e) walling off the French doors from the sunroom leading to the greenhouse; 
f) cutting through the brick exterior to add an additional door to the exterior; g) 
removing trees and clearing substantial brush and plantings from the grounds; h) 
refinishing the swimming pool; i) replacing the pool’s heating and filtration system; 
and j) repairing/replacing the concrete decking around the pool. Id. 
 20. Id. at 275. 
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decided not to discuss it with McGowan or take any action to prevent it.21  
Meanwhile, 6 Clayton Terrace proceeded with its plan to split Lot 6 and 
sought approval from the Planning and Zoning Commission of the City of 
Frontenac.22  In April 2014, 6 Clayton Terrace filed an application with 
the City of Frontenac to subdivide Lot 6 into two lots – Lots 6A and 6B.23  
The Trustees appeared at public meetings in opposition to 6 Clayton 
Terrace’s proposal to subdivide Lot 6.24  The City of Frontenac informed 
the Trustees that it did not have authority to enforce the Subdivision’s 
private indentures and was bound solely by the city’s ordinances, which 
required only that each lot be larger than one acre.25  Accordingly, 
Frontenac approved 6 Clayton Terrace’s application on the grounds that it 
did not violate any municipal ordinances.26  
In August 2014, the Trustees filed a two-count petition against Ms. 
Huey and 6 Clayton Terrace seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.27  
Count II sought an injunction to prevent 6 Clayton Terrace from dividing 
Lot 6 into two lots and constructing a residence on the newly-established 
sub-lot, claiming the split would violate the “one residence per lot” 
restriction.28  6 Clayton Terrace denied the Trustees’ claim and asserted 
affirmative defenses, including that the “one residence per lot” restriction 
added to the original indentures in 1928 was invalid because it was 
adopted without unanimous consent of the lot owners.29  
On Count II, the trial court found in the Trustees’ favor, enjoining 6 
Clayton Terrace from dividing Lot 6 and constructing an additional 
home.30  The trial court reasoned that because the indentures “neither 
expressly prohibited nor expressly allowed for the subdivision of lots,” the 
intent of the indentures governed.31  Thus, in light of all the provisions of 
the indentures, the trial court concluded that the Trustees intended for the 
 
 21. Id. Two of the concerned trustees were made aware of the plan to subdivide 
Lot 6 within ten days of the closing and they chose to “just wait and see” and hoped 
“[it wasn’t] going to be an issue.” Trustees of Clayton Terrace Subdivision v. 6 
Clayton Terrace, LLC, 2018 WL 3028991, at *2 (Mo. Ct. App. June 19, 2018). 
 22. Clayton Terrace, 585 S.W.3d at 275. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. Not relevant for the purposes of this Note, Count I sought a declaratory 
judgment against Ms. Huey for the court to declare the sale of Lot 6 to 6 Clayton 
Terrace void, claiming she violated the amended indentures by failing to provide 
fifteen days’ written notice to all of the Subdivision lot owners and failing to accept 
one lot owner’s offer to purchase Lot 6. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 276. 
 31. Id. 
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limitation of “one residence per lot” to prohibit subdivision of the original 
lots.32  Furthermore, the court found that 6 Clayton Terrace’s failure to 
give notice of its plan to the Trustees was an act of bad faith, which 
constituted “special circumstances” and justified an award of substantial 
attorney’s fees in its judgment against 6 Clayton Terrace.33  6 Clayton 
Terrace appealed.34 
On appeal, 6 Clayton Terrace raised five points, two of which are 
relevant here.35  First, 6 Clayton Terrace claimed the “one residence per 
lot” provision was invalid and unenforceable because it was never 
unanimously approved by the Subdivision lot owners.36  In its second 
point, 6 Clayton Terrace asserted that even if the one-residence limitation 
was valid, it did not prohibit splitting a lot and constructing a residence on 
the new sub-lot.37  The appellate court denied 6 Clayton Terrace’s first 
point, holding that the “one residence per lot” restriction was not a new 
burden and thus did not require unanimous consent to be valid and 
enforceable.38  However, reversing the trial court’s decision, the appellate 
court granted 6 Clayton Terrace’s second point.39  The court reasoned the 
“one residence per lot” restriction did not by its “plain and clear language” 
preclude the subdivision of a lot.40  Furthermore, the court stated that the 
“one residence per lot” provision was a restriction on the use of property, 
and “[r]estrictions, being in derogation of the fee conveyed, will not be 
extended by implication to include anything not clearly expressed.”41  The 
Missouri Court of Appeals therefore held that 6 Clayton Terrace’s 
subdivision of Lot 6 was not prohibited by the “one residence per lot” 
restriction in the indentures.42   
 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. The Trustees also appealed the trial court’s ruling in Ms. Huey’s favor on 
Count I, referenced above, finding no violation by Ms. Huey with regard to the sale 
and additionally finding in favor of Ms. Huey on her abuse of process counterclaim 
against the Trustees for bringing Count I against her for the “improper purpose of 
preventing 6 Clayton Terrace from constructing another residence on Lot 6.” Id. 
 35.  Trustees of Clayton Terrace Subdivision v. 6 Clayton Terrace, LLC, 2018 
WL 3028991, at *3 (Mo. Ct. App. June 19, 2018). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at *6. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. (quoting Van Deusen v. Ruth, 125 S.W.2d 1, 3 (1938)). The Supreme 
Court of Missouri articulated the principle that restrictive covenants will be strictly 
construed more clearly in Vinyard v. St. Louis Cty., 399 S.W.2d 99, 105 (Mo. 1966) 
(“Restrictive covenants will not be extended by implication to include anything not 
clearly expressed in them.”). 
 42. Trustees of Clayton Terrace Subdivision, 2018 WL 3028991, at *6. 
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After the opinion by the Missouri Court of Appeals, the Supreme 
Court of Missouri granted transfer.43  The court addressed the same 
relevant issues as the appellate court: (1) whether the language in the 
indentures that restrictions may be “amended or extended by two-thirds of 
the lot owners” granted authority to add new burdens to the indentures, 
and (2) if so, whether the “one residence per lot” provision restricted 
subdividing lots.44  
On the first issue, the court held that “amend” in the context of 
subdivision indentures means “to change or modify in any way for the 
better,” which in turn gives the requisite majority of lot owners the power 
to not only alter existing restrictions, but also to add new restrictions.45  
Thus, the “one residence per lot” limitation was valid and enforceable.46  
On the second issue, the court held that when a restrictive subdivision 
covenant – read in the context of the entire instrument – indicates a specific 
intent, the restriction should not be so narrowly construed as to defeat its 
plain purpose.47  Because the court found the “one residence per lot” 
provision was clearly intended to limit the residences to one per original 
lot, 6 Clayton Terrace could not split Lot 6 in two.48 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
 
A. Missouri’s Attempted Balance of the Principles of Contract 
and Property Law 
Missouri courts traditionally treated restrictive covenants in 
residential subdivision indentures as “private contractual obligations” and, 
therefore, applied the principles of contract law when interpreting a 
subdivision’s covenants.49  The primary rule in the interpretation of a 
covenant or contract is to determine the intent of the parties and to give 
effect to those intentions.50  To ascertain the parties’ intent, courts give the 
words of the contract their “natural, ordinary, and common sense 
 
 43. Trustees of Clayton Terrace Subdivision v. 6 Clayton Terrace, LLC, 585 
S.W.3d 269, 276 (Mo. 2019) (en banc). 
 44. Id. at 279–80. 
 45. Id. at 282. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 282–83. 
 48. Id. at 284. 
 49. See Brentmoor Place Residents Ass’n v. Warren, 816 S.W.2d 7, 11 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1991); see also Arbors at Sugar Creek Homeowners Ass’n v. Jefferson Bank & 
Tr. Co., 464 S.W.3d 177, 183 (Mo. 2015) (en banc). 
 50. Arbors, 464 S.W.3d at 183. 
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meaning” in light of the contract’s terms “read as a whole.”51  
Additionally, courts construe each term of a contract in effort to avoid 
rendering the other terms meaningless.52 
While Missouri law acknowledges the right of property owners to 
collectively restrict their property rights for a common purpose and seeks 
to enforce the intent underlying a subdivision’s covenants, Missouri 
simultaneously strives to protect “the free and untrammeled use of real 
property.”53  This conflict lies at the intersection of contract and property 
law, where courts must interpret residential subdivision covenants in the 
face of the right of property owners “to specify the uses to which land may 
be put and … to prevent use for any purpose not included.”54  Missouri 
law disfavors restrictive covenants because they undermine property 
rights, and it generally refuses to extend the meaning of ambiguous 
restrictions “by implication to include anything not clearly expressed.”55       
Furthermore, courts resolve ambiguities in restrictive covenants “in 
favor of the use complained of.”56  Accordingly, when Missouri courts 
have had the opportunity to interpret ambiguous restrictive covenants in 
residential subdivision indentures, the restrictions have been narrowly 
construed in favor of the free use of property.57  However, strict 
construction “should never be applied in such a way as to defeat the plain 
purpose of the restriction,”58 and the “right of one property owner to the 
protection of a restrictive covenant is a property right just as inviolable” 
 
 51. Wilshire Const. Co. v. Union Elec. Co., 463 S.W.2d 903, 906 (Mo. 1971); 
Dunn Indus. Grp., Inc. v. City of Sugar Creek, 112 S.W.3d 421, 428 (Mo. 2003) (en 
banc). 
 52. Dunn, 112 S.W.3d at 428. 
 53. Steve Vogli & Co. v. Lane, 405 S.W.2d 885, 889 (Mo. 1966). 
 54. Trustees of Clayton Terrace Subdivision v. 6 Clayton Terrace, LLC, 585 
S.W.3d 269, 287 (Mo. 2019) (en banc) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (quoting Matthews v. First Christian Church of St. Louis, 197 S.W.2d 617, 
620). 
 55. Trustees of Clayton Terrace Subdivision v. 6 Clayton Terrace, LLC, 2018 
WL 3028991, at *6 (Mo. Ct. App. June 19, 2018) (quoting Van Deusen v. Ruth, 125 
S.W.2d 1, 3 (Mo. 1938) (“Restrictions, being in derogation of the fee conveyed, will 
not be extended by implication to include anything not clearly expressed.”); see also 
Andrews v. Metro. Bldg. Co., 163 S.W.2d 1024, 1028 (Mo. 1942). 
 56. Andrews, 163 S.W.2d at 1028 (quoting Mathews Real Estate Co. v. National 
Printing & Engraving Co., 48 S.W.2d 911, 913 (Mo. 1932)). 
 57. Blevins v. Barry–Lawrence Cnty. Ass’n for Retarded Citizens, 707 S.W.2d 
407, 408 (Mo. 1986) (en banc); Shepherd v. State, 427 S.W.2d 382, 386–87 (Mo. 
1968); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Tipton Electric, 636 S.W.2d 357, 359 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1982); Udo Siebel-Spath v. Constr. Enters., 633 S.W.2d 86, 88 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1982). 
 58. See, e.g., Berkley v. Conway P’ship, 708 S.W.2d 225, 227 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1986); Weiss v. Fayant, 606 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Buoncristiani v. 
Randall, 526 S.W.2d 68, 72 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975). 
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as the right to the free and untrammeled use of his property.59  In short, 
Missouri attempts to strike a balance between the competing interests of 
contract and property law, refusing to extend and restrict property use 
further, but also construing clear language so as not to defeat the purpose 
of the restraint.  
 
B. Van Deusen and Missouri’s Traditional Definition of 
“Amend” 
 
Missouri courts have applied these contract and property law 
principles in cases where they have been asked to interpret the meaning of 
“amend” in the context of residential subdivision covenants.60  Van 
Deusen was the landmark case in Missouri law for interpreting the extent 
of power conveyed by terms such as “amend” or “modify” in subdivision 
provisions authorizing changes by a requisite majority vote.61  Since the 
Supreme Court of Missouri’s Van Deusen decision in 1938, Missouri 
courts have generally held that a provision authorizing a requisite majority 
of lot owners to “amend” or “modify” a subdivision’s covenants cannot be 
construed to permit the adoption of additional restrictions.62  It is a well-
established principle in Missouri law that amending restrictive covenants 
to increase burdens on the use of real property requires unanimous 
consent.63  Thus, the rule in Missouri has been that a new restrictive 
covenant is “invalid and unenforceable if it imposes new burdens upon the 
affected property owners” without unanimous approval.64  
In Van Deusen, the original restrictions included in the subdivision 
agreement for Davis Place, a real estate subdivision, permitted the building 
of apartments, stores, and other commercial buildings only on lots facing 
specific roads.65  The agreement stated that the restrictions could be 
 
 59. Marose v. Deves, 697 S.W.2d 279, 289 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (citing Proetz v. 
Cent. Dist. of Christian & Missionary All., 191 S.W.2d 273, 277 (Mo. Ct. App. 1945)). 
 60. See, e.g., Van Deusen v. Ruth, 125 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Mo. 1938); Bumm v. Olde 
Ivy Dev., LLC, 142 S.W.3d 895, 903 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004); Jones v. Ladriere, 108 
S.W.3d 736, 739–40 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003); Webb v. Mullikin, 142 S.W.3d 822, 827 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2004); Hazelbaker v. Cty. of St. Charles, 235 S.W.3d 598, 602 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 2007). 
 61. See Trustees of Clayton Terrace Subdivision v. 6 Clayton Terrace, LLC, 585 
S.W.3d 269, 282 (Mo. 2019) (en banc) (stating cases with similar facts have been 
decided based on an interpretation and application of Van Deusen). 
 62. Van Deusen, 125 S.W.2d at 2–3. 
 63. See Bumm, 142 S.W.3d at 903; Van Deusen, 125 S.W.2d at 2–3; Jones, 108 
S.W.3d at 739–40; Webb, 142 S.W.3d at 827; Hazelbaker, 235 S.W.3d at 602. 
 64. Bumm, 142 S.W.3d at 903 (“[A] new restrictive covenant, adopted by 
majority vote only, is invalid and unenforceable if it imposes new burdens upon the 
affected property owners.”); accord Van Deusen, 125 S.W.2d at 2–3; Jones, 108 
S.W.3d 739–40; Webb, 142 S.W.3d at 827; Hazelbaker, 235 S.W.3d at 602. 
 65. Van Deusen, 125 S.W.2d at 2. 
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“modified, amended, released, or extinguished” at any time after ten years 
by a vote of the owners of seventy-five percent of the subdivision’s 
“frontage.”66  Eleven years after Davis Place adopted the original 
restrictions, a modification agreement, purportedly made with the 
approval of the requisite majority but not with unanimous approval, 
increased prohibitions on the erection of apartments and commercial 
buildings.67  
The plaintiffs, whose lots were affected by the change, filed a suit to 
invalidate the amendment on the grounds that the language of the original 
agreement did not permit the requisite majority of frontage owners to 
increase burdens on the subdivision.68  The plaintiffs contended that the 
words “modified” and “amended,” as used in the original agreement, could 
not be construed to authorize additional restrictions.69  The trial court ruled 
in the plaintiffs’ favor, and the Supreme Court of Missouri upheld that 
ruling on appeal.70  In support of its decision, the court held that 
“amended” as used in a provision authorizing changes to a subdivision 
agreement means “an amelioration” and should not be interpreted in a way 
that would authorize new burdens.71  Furthermore, the court noted that 
interpreting “amended” to authorize the imposition of new restrictions on 
the subdivision would mean overturning the well-established principle of 
strict construction of restrictive covenants.72 
The Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, applied the Van 
Deusen court’s reasoning to a similar set of facts in Jones v. Ladriere.73  
In Jones, Ladriere purchased a vacant lot in the Berkley Lane subdivision 
with the intention of constructing a residence.74  The subdivision 
agreement provided that the restrictions could be “altered, amended, 
changed or revoked” by a two-thirds vote.75  After Ladriere had plans 
drawn up and obtained a building permit from the City of Ladue, a large 
majority of the other lot owners passed a new restrictive covenant which 
specifically prohibited construction on the vacant lot purchased by 
Ladriere.76  The subdivision trustees filed a petition for declaratory and 
 
 66. Id. (emphasis added). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. As mentioned above, the requisite majority in this case constituted 
property owners “owning seventy-five per cent of the total number of front feet of the 
subdivision.” Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 3. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Jones v. Ladriere, 108 S.W.3d 736 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003). 
 74. Id. at 737. 
 75. Id. at 739 (emphasis added). 
 76. Id. at 737. Amendment No. 4 added Article VIII to the subdivision 
agreement. Id. Article VIII purported to limit the construction of single-family 
9
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injunctive relief seeking to prohibit Ladriere from constructing a residence 
on his property.77  The trial court found the new amendment enforceable, 
held in the trustees’ favor, and enjoined the construction.78  The Eastern 
District reversed the trial court’s judgment and held that, as in Van Deusen, 
nothing in the language of the amendment provision gave lot owners “the 
power to add new burdens or restrictions not found in the original 
Agreement” by the requisite two-thirds vote.79 
One year after the Jones decision, the Eastern District again relied on 
Van Deusen and held that language similar to that in Jones and Van 
Deusen did not sufficiently evidence an intent to authorize new restrictions 
by requisite majority vote.80  In Webb v. Mullikin, the subdivision 
agreement, adopted in 1960 and amended in 1990, provided that “a 
majority of the lot owners. . .may amend these restrictions,” so long as the 
subdivision Trustees propose the amendment.81  In 2002, a majority of the 
lot owners approved an amendment to the restrictions, proposed by the 
Trustees, that included a new yearly assessment for maintenance of the 
recreational club located next to the subdivision, which was not included 
in the original agreement.82  Eight property owners in the subdivision 
brought an action to enjoin enforcement of the 2002 amendments.83  The 
Eastern District reversed the trial court’s judgment that the amended 
agreement was lawful.84  Citing both Van Deusen and Jones in its decision, 
the appellate court interpreted the language “may amend these 
restrictions” to permit the requisite majority of lot owners “to change 
existing covenants but not to add new or different covenants.”85 
In 2004, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, adhered 
to the principles established in Van Deusen by holding that even language 
more explicit than the amendment provisions in Van Deusen, Jones, and 
Webb was still insufficient to authorize additional burdens.86  In Bumm v. 
Olde Ivy Development, LLC, the  set of nine restrictive covenants recorded 
in 1955 with the subdivision plat included an amendment provision that 
expressly stated the restrictions “may be amended, repealed or added to at 
any time by the owners of a majority of the lots.”87  In 2002, a majority of 
 
dwellings to the properties identified by a residential address. Id. at 738. The vacant 
lot purchased by Ladriere did not have a residential address. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 740. 
 80. See Webb v. Mullikin, 142 S.W.3d 822 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004). 
 81. Id. at 827. 
 82. Id. at 824. 
 83. Id. at 823, 825. 
 84. Id. at 828. 
 85. Id. at 827 (emphasis added). 
 86. Bumm v. Olde Ivy Dev., LLC, 142 S.W.3d 895 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004). 
 87. Id. at 897–98 (emphasis added). 
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the lot owners approved two new restrictive covenants, which included a 
prohibition on “replatting” any subdivision lot as a separate subdivision or 
as a portion of another subdivision.88  When the defendant recorded a plat 
for a new subdivision development that included a partial replat of certain 
lots in the original subdivision, the plaintiffs sought to enforce the 2002 
restrictions to preclude replatting of the lots.89  The court reaffirmed the 
rule that “a new restrictive covenant, adopted by majority vote only, is 
invalid and unenforceable if it imposes new burdens.”90  Relying on Van 
Deusen’s definition of “amend” in the context of a modification provision 
and its application in Jones and Webb, the Bumm court held that strict 
construction rendered even the words “added to” insufficiently explicit to 
permit a non-unanimous, requisite majority to adopt additional 
restrictions.91  Thus, the 2002 restrictions were invalid and unenforceable 
because they constituted a new burden on the subdivision lot owners.92 
Given Missouri case law’s consistent application of Van Deusen’s 
definition of “amend” in residential subdivision cases, 6 Clayton Terrace 
argued that the court should construe the “amended or extended” language 
like the courts did in Jones, Webb, and Bumm.93  Specifically, 6 Clayton 
Terrace asked the court to hold that use of the word “amended” in the 
Subdivision indentures was not sufficiently explicit to permit the addition 
of the “one residence per lot” restriction without unanimous lot owner 
approval.94   
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
On transfer from the Missouri Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court 
of Missouri unanimously agreed to abrogate Jones, Webb, and Bumm, 
holding that the amendment provision’s language that restrictions would 
be in force “unless amended or extended” was sufficiently specific to 
permit adding restrictions.95  Judge Powell and Judge Fischer agreed with 
the majority on the validity of the “one residence per lot” restriction, but 
 
 88. Id. at 898 (emphasis added). 
 89. Id. at 897–99 (emphasis added). 
 90. Id. at 903. 
 91. Id. at 904–05 (“As in Van Deusen, Jones and Webb, we strictly construe this 
language to mean that the Unit 2 lot owners may change, repeal or supplement existing 
covenants, but they may not add new burdens or different covenants by majority 
vote.”). 
 92. Id. at 905. 
 93. Trustees of Clayton Terrace Subdivision v. 6 Clayton Terrace, LLC, 585 
S.W.3d 269, 281 (Mo. 2019) (en banc). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 282. 
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they disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that it precluded subdividing 
a lot within the Subdivision and building one residence on each sub-lot.96 
A.  Majority Opinion 
The Supreme Court of Missouri rejected 6 Clayton Terrace’s 
assertion that the original indentures did not expressly permit the addition 
of restrictions pursuant to the amendment provision.97  The court chose not 
to follow Van Deusen, reasoning that Van Deusen’s narrow definition of 
“amend” was only applicable to the facts and unique language of the 
particular indentures in that case.98  Thus, the court concluded Van Deusen 
“has no persuasive – let alone binding – force under the present facts or in 
cases using different language.”99  
After freeing itself from the Van Deusen precedent that led Missouri 
appellate courts to interpret the use of “amend” narrowly,100 the court 
imparted a broader meaning on the words “amended or extended.”101  The 
court stated “amend” means “to change or modify in any way for the 
better” and to “extend” means “to cause to be longer.”102  The court used 
these definitions to support its conclusion that the language of the 
indenture was intended to permit two-thirds of the homeowners to add 
restrictions, as both “amend” and “extend” inherently broaden the reach 
of the list of restrictions either in effect or in time.103  
As evidence of the indentures’ intended meaning, the court noted the 
lot owners had adopted amendments that added restrictions multiple times 
by a less-than-unanimous vote over the life of the Subdivision.104  
Furthermore, the court observed that nothing in the context of the 
indentures suggested the words “amend” and “extend” were used in a way 
other than their normal meaning.105  Therefore, the court concluded the 
 
 96. Id. at 287 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 97. Id. at 279. 
 98. Id. at 281. 
 99. Id. at 282. 
 100. The Van Deusen court determined that “amend” in the context of a restrictive 
covenant means an “amelioration of the thing (as by changing the phraseology of an 
instrument, so as to make it more distinct or specific) without involving the idea of 
any change in substance or essence.” Van Deusen v. Ruth, 125 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Mo. 
1938). 
 101. Clayton Terrace, 585 S.W.3d at 281. 
 102. Id. (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 68 (3d ed. 1966)). 
 103. Id. (“As noted above, the Clayton Terrace indentures state “[t]he following 
restrictions shall be in force and binding upon the owners of this Subdivision for a 
period of 25 years from date of this instrument, unless amended or extended by two-
thirds of the lot owners.”). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 282. 
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plain language of the original indentures granted lot owners, with the 
requisite majority vote, the power to change or modify the list of 
restrictions in any way they believed was “for the better,” including by 
adding restrictions.106  Consequently, the addition of the “one residence 
per lot” restriction was a permissible amendment given that it was 
approved by the requisite two-thirds of the owners.107 
The court also rejected 6 Clayton Terrace’s argument that, even if the 
“one residence per lot” limitation was valid, it did not prohibit dividing 
Lot 6 into two lots and building a residence on each sub-lot.108  The court 
determined that the term “each lot,”109 when considered in the context of 
the entire indentures, unambiguously referred to the twenty-three lots 
included on the plat that accompanied the original indentures.110  The court 
also noted other situations in the indentures that evidenced an intent not to 
allow subdivision of existing lots.111  For example, the court referenced the 
“right of first refusal” provision in the indentures, which stated if lots are 
purchased by more than one owner, the owners must take pro rata shares 
in the single lot and are not permitted to divide the lot pro rata.112  The 
court reasoned that this restriction and the “one residence per lot” 
limitation would be effectively meaningless if a lot owner could 
circumvent them simply by subdividing the lot after purchase.113  Thus, 
the court concluded that because the lot owners adopted the “one residence 
per lot” restriction with a clear intent – to protect the homeowners of the 
Subdivision by limiting each original lot to one residence – 6 Clayton 
Terrace could not avoid the restriction by subdividing Lot 6.114  
B.  Concurrence in Part, Dissent in Part 
Judge Powell authored an opinion concurring in part and dissenting 
in part.  Judge Powell agreed with the majority opinion’s definition of 
“amend” and its authorization of additional restrictions by the requisite 
two-thirds vote, but he disagreed that the “one residence per lot” provision 
restricted subdivision of a lot.115  He reasserted the principle that “courts 
fail to zealously protect the fundamental right to freely own and use private 
 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. As noted above, the actual language of the restriction provided that “only one 
residence shall be erected on each lot.” Id. at 273. 
 110. Id. at 283. 
 111. Id. at 284. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 287 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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property by enforcing restrictions that do not appear in the text of a 
covenant.”116  Judge Powell stated the plain and obvious purpose of the 
“one residence per lot” limitation was to prohibit the construction of 
multiple residences on a single lot.117  Thus, in his opinion, inferring a “no 
subdivision” restriction into the “one residence per lot” provision violated 
the Supreme Court of Missouri’s precedent favoring the free use of 
property unless property owners have voluntarily and unambiguously 
surrendered their rights.118   
Judge Powell reasoned that because the provision does not address 
lot owners’ authority to split their lots into sub-lots, the only way to 
conclude the covenant prohibited such a division was to infer that the 
phrase “each lot” limits the total number of lots to those in existence when 
the Subdivision adopted the covenant.119  He considered such an inference, 
while plausible under the circumstances, was not clearly expressed in the 
covenant.  He asserted that inference would violate the principle that 
restrictive covenants should “not be extended by implication to include 
anything not clearly expressed in them.”120  Therefore, Judge Powell 
concluded that 6 Clayton Terrace should have been free to subdivide its 
lot.121  While this Note focuses on the meaning of “amend” in residential 
subdivision agreements, the court’s disagreement on the interpretation of 
the “one residence per lot” restriction demonstrates the struggle to balance 
the principles of property law and contract law.   
V.  COMMENT 
The Supreme Court of Missouri’s seminal decision in Van Deusen 
created a standard that was repeatedly echoed and applied not only by that 
court and each of the Missouri’s appellate divisions for eighty years 
thereafter, but also by appellate and supreme courts in other states.122  
Thus, based on previous interpretations of the meaning of the words 
“amend” and “modify,” the established law in Missouri at the time of trial 
was that subdivisions could amend the restrictive covenants at any time 
 
 116. Id. at 287 (citing Steve Vogli & Co. v. Lane, 405 S.W.2d 885, 889 (Mo. 1966) 
(en banc)). 
 117. Id. at 288. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. (citing Vinyard v. St. Louis Cty., 399 S.W.2d 99, 105 (Mo. 1966)). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Van Deusen v. Ruth, 125 S.W.2d 1, 2–3 (Mo. 1938); see Boyles v. 
Hausmann, 517 N.W.2d 610, 616 (Neb. 1994); Grace Fellowship Church, Inc. v. 
Harned, 5 N.E.3d 1108, 1114 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013); Webb v. Finger Contract Supply 
Co., 447 S.W.2d 906, 908 (Tex. 1969). 
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with unanimous consent of the lot owners.123  However, when amendments 
were adopted by less than unanimous vote, as happened in this case, the 
reviewing court must determine if the amendment imposed a new or 
additional burden upon the affected property that did not previously 
exist.124  If it did impose a new burden, Missouri law dictated it must be 
adopted unanimously, and amendment by any lesser majority vote 
rendered the new restriction invalid and unenforceable.125 
Without the Supreme Court of Missouri’s willingness to limit Van 
Deusen’s applicability and redefine “amend” as it applies in the context of 
residential subdivision indentures, 6 Clayton Terrace almost certainly 
would have succeeded in splitting Lot 6 into two sub-lots because the 
restriction limiting “one residence per lot” was an additional burden not 
contemplated when the Subdivision adopted the original indentures.126  
However, after Trustees of Clayton Terrace, Van Deusen is no longer 
binding law.  While the court in the instant case did not expressly overrule 
Van Deusen, it effectively eliminated future reliance on its holding by 
characterizing its reasoning as “suspect” and its definition of  “amend” as 
“unaccountably narrow.”127  The Court further noted that the numerous 
appellate cases relying on Van Deusen, such as Jones, Webb, and Bumm, 
do not hold precedential value because they were “decided in error based 
on a misinterpretation and misapplication of Van Deusen.”128  
While Trustees of Clayton Terrace marks a shift in Missouri 
jurisprudence, Missouri is not the first state to permit a requisite majority 
of lot owners to adopt new restrictions pursuant to a subdivision’s 
amendment provision.129  It is likely that the Supreme Court of Missouri 
was aware of a trend in the law in favor of allowing a requisite majority to 
add new restrictions, and the court’s appreciation of that trend may explain 
its overwhelming willingness to depart from Missouri’s existing law.  For 
example, in Evergreen Highlands Ass’n v. West, the Colorado Supreme 
Court permitted a requisite majority of lot owners in a residential 
 
 123. See, e.g., Steve Vogli & Co. v. Lane, 405 S.W.2d 885, 888 (Mo. 1966); 
Bumm v. Olde Ivy Development, LLC, 142 S.W.3d 895, 903 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004); 
Pearce v. Scarcello, 920 S.W.2d 643, 644 n.3 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); Kauffman v. 
Roling, 851 S.W.2d 789, 792 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993). 
 124. See, e.g., Bumm, 142 S.W.3d at 903; Hazelbaker v. Cty. of St. Charles, 235 
S.W.3d 598, 602 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007). 
 125. See, e.g., Van Deusen, 125 S.W.2d at 2–3; Hazelbaker, 235 S.W.3d at 603; 
Bumm, 142 S.W.3d at 903; Jones v. Ladriere, 108 S.W.3d 736, 740 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2003); Webb v. Mullikin, 142 S.W.3d 822, 827 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004). 
 126. Trustees of Clayton Terrace Subdivision v. 6 Clayton Terrace, LLC, 585 
S.W.3d 269, 281–82 (Mo. 2019) (en banc). 
 127. Id. at 282. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See, e.g., Evergreen Highlands Ass’n v. West, 73 P.3d 1, 7 (Colo. 2003) (en 
banc). 
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subdivision to “change or modify” existing covenants by adding new 
covenants.130  In Evergreen Highlands, a homeowner who was opposed to 
an amendment which required mandatory assessments be paid to the 
homeowners’ association argued that the amendment was a “new” 
covenant requiring unanimous consent and was thus invalid – the same 
argument made by 6 Clayton Terrace.131  The Colorado Supreme Court 
looked to how other jurisdictions interpreted similar amendment 
provisions and held that the terms “change” and “modify” authorized the 
addition of new covenants.132  This analysis of the language used in the 
Evergreen Highlands’ modification clause mirrors the Supreme Court of 
Missouri’s interpretation of the words “amend” and “extend” in Trustees 
of Clayton Terrace, as well as a meaningful trend of case law from other 
states.133   
The Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, had a chance to 
adopt Evergreen Highland’s analysis one year later in Webb but instead 
applied the Van Deusen precedent, citing cases in other states, such as 
Boyles v. Hausmann from Nebraska, as additional support.134  This further 
enforced Missouri’s disfavor of restrictive covenants and tendency 
towards giving the benefit of the doubt in interpreting amendment 
provisions in favor of upholding property rights.135  Thus, the fact that the 
Supreme Court of Missouri buried such a substantial change of precedent 
within the Trustees of Clayton Terrace decision indicates the court may 
have overlooked the possible repercussions of its ruling.136   
The lack of any language in the Trustees of Clayton Terrace opinion 
limiting application of the new rule indicates the court may have been 
quick to limit Van Deusen’s precedential value and to throw out other 
cases applying Van Deusen to similar facts.137  For example, the Evergreen 
Highlands decision carefully noted that “the severity of consequences,” 
specifically how “substantial and unforeseeable” the impact is on the 
objecting lot owner, may result in courts invalidating amendments adopted 
by  consent of the requisite majority.138  The Supreme Court of Missouri 
 
 130. Id. at 2. 
 131. Id. at 3. 
 132. Id. at 3–4. 
 133. Id. at 4–5; see also Zito v. Gerken, 587 N.E.2d 1048, 1050 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1992); Sunday Canyon Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Annett, 978 S.W.2d 654, 657 (Tex. 
App. 1998); Windemere Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. McCue, 990 P.2d 769, 773 
(Mont. 1999). 
 134. Webb v. Mullikin, 142 S.W.3d 822, 827 n.3 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (citing 
Boyles v. Hausmann, 517 N.W.2d 610 (Neb. 1994)). 
 135. Id. (citing Van Deusen v. Ruth, 125 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Mo. 1938)). 
 136. Trustees of Clayton Terrace Subdivision v. 6 Clayton Terrace, LLC, 585 
S.W.3d 269, 281–82 (Mo. 2019) (en banc). 
 137. Id. at 282. 
 138. Evergreen, 73 P.3d at 6. 
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did not include similar limiting language in its Trustees of Clayton Terrace 
opinion.139  Thus, Trustees of Clayton Terrace would seem to allow 
homeowners to add restrictions and increase burdens by a requisite 
majority vote in all situations with similarly worded amendment 
covenants.140  
Prior Missouri case law in tension with Van Deusen may have 
provided further support for the Trustees of Clayton Terrace decision.  For 
example, in Lake Tishomingo Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Cronin, the Supreme 
Court of Missouri upheld a less-than-unanimously approved amendment 
imposing a special assessment on the lot owners for nonroutine 
maintenance of the subdivision’s community lake.141  A majority of voting 
lot owners approved a one-time special assessment, recorded as an 
amendment to the subdivision covenants, for dredging necessary to 
preserve a 120-acre community lake and the property value of the 930 lots 
surrounding it.142  The court noted that “under the unique circumstances” 
of the case, the special assessment was enforceable only under the court’s 
power to “render equity.”143  In fact, the court stated it was “undisputed 
that the special assessment was not authorized by the covenant restrictions 
contained in the original indenture and no provision … permitted their 
subsequent modification.”144  Thus, the court was not enforcing an 
increased burden or additional restriction on the lot owners’ use of their 
property adopted as an amendment to the original indentures, but it was 
recognizing that the lot owners had a contractual obligation to bear their 
fair share of the cost of preserving the subdivision’s common properties.145  
While Lake Tishomingo creates possible precedent for Trustees of Clayton 
Terrace, the court’s narrow holding and equitable enforcement of a less-
than-unanimously approved amendment to the original subdivision 
indentures does not create the same cause for concern created by Trustees 
of Clayton Terrace.146   
Under the new precedent established by Trustees of Clayton Terrace, 
any residential subdivision indenture that allows for amendment by a 
requisite majority vote now authorizes the imposition of additional 
restrictions or burdens on property owners who may not have voluntarily 
 
 139. Clayton Terrace, 585 S.W.3d at 282. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Lake Tishomingo Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Cronin, 679 S.W.2d 852, 857 (Mo. 
1984) (en banc). 
 142. Id. at 854. 
 143. Id. at 857. 
 144. Id. at 853 (alteration in original). 
 145. Id. at 857. 
 146. Id. 
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surrendered their rights.147  The court further solidified the practice of 
interpreting amendment provisions in subdivision cases in a manner 
consistent with the general principles of contract law.148  Proponents of 
this policy will see it as promoting a more reasonable and ordinary reading 
of a subdivision’s indentures and will permit subdivisions, condominiums, 
and residential communities across the state to make common sense 
changes and improvements to their restrictions.  While this will likely 
prove to be sound policy in many instances, it marks a substantial 
deviation from Missouri law’s existing policy of interpreting amendment 
provisions narrowly in favor of the free use of property.149  The court’s 
decision in Bumm exemplifies Missouri courts’ staunch protection of this 
policy.150  The Bumm court concluded that even the words “added to” in 
the indenture’s amendment provision were not sufficiently explicit to 
permit the addition of restrictions by less than unanimous vote.151  
Missouri courts’ traditional adherence to the principle of narrowly 
construing amendment provisions stems from concern for the 
ramifications of giving homeowners’ associations significant power in 
making rules – and justifiably so.152  Now, a simple requisite majority of 
lot owners in a subdivision can vote to do any number of things, including 
increasing restrictions on land use beyond subdivision residents’ 
expectations when they purchased their lots.153  A reasonable explanation 
for the Trustees of Clayton Terrace holding may be that, because the 
disputed amendment occurred prior to their purchase of Lot 6, McGowan 
and 6 Clayton Terrace were on notice that the “one residence per lot” 
restriction might preclude their ability to split the lot.154  Thus, McGowan 
and 6 Clayton Terrace were not the most sympathetic figures – they were 
real estate developers who bought Lot 6 with the knowledge that the 
Subdivision covenants may prevent them from carrying out their plan. 
However, after the holding in Trustees of Clayton Terrace, it is not 
difficult to imagine increased instances of a buyer’s detrimental reliance 
on subdivision covenants as they exist at the time of purchase.155  There 
are likely to be more cases like Jones, where a good-faith buyer, knowing 
and relying on the subdivision’s restrictions at the time of purchase, buys 
 
 147. Trustees of Clayton Terrace Subdivision v. 6 Clayton Terrace, LLC, 585 
S.W.3d 269, 282 (Mo. 2019) (en banc). 
 148. Id. at 280. 
 149. Id. at 282; see also Van Deusen v. Ruth, 125 S.W.2d 1, 3–4 (Mo. 1938); 
Webb v. Mullikin, 142 S.W.3d 822, 827 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004). 
 150. Bumm v. Olde Ivy Development, LLC, 142 S.W.3d 895, 903 (Mo Ct. App. 
2004). 
 151. Id. at 904–05. 
 152. Van Deusen v. Ruth, 125 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Mo. 1938). 
 153. Clayton Terrace, 585 S.W.3d at 282. 
 154. Id. at 273–74. 
 155. Id. at 282. 
18
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 3 [], Art. 12
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol86/iss3/12
2021] REDEFINING “AMEND” 1017 
a property with the intention to use it for a permitted purpose only to then 
have the homeowners’ association, after learning of the purchaser’s 
intended use, adopt an amendment that takes away an existing right.156  
Under the precedent established by Trustees of Clayton Terrace, more 
sympathetic characters than career real estate developers, like the lot 
purchaser in Jones, will be stuck with a piece of property they can no 
longer use for its intended and anticipated purpose.157  
It is easy to identify further areas of potential conflict associated with 
giving homeowners’ associations the ability to impose new restrictions on 
subdivision lot owners.  Subdivisions and residential communities now 
have more flexibility in restricting lot owners’ ability to use their property 
for short-term rentals in the form of Airbnb, VRBO, and other similar 
internet-based rental services, which seems likely to be an increasing 
source of dispute as the demand for such services continues to grow.158  
For example, imagine you own a home, located in a residential 
subdivision, that you only live in during the summer.  The rest of the year, 
while living elsewhere, you generate additional income renting out your 
summer home via Airbnb.  If your neighbors decide they do not appreciate 
having renters come and go, Clayton Terrace gives them the ability to 
preclude you from renting out your home.159  They must only garner the 
requisite majority vote of approval, as provided in the subdivision 
indenture’s amendment provision, needed to pass an amendment 
prohibiting renting homes in the subdivision.160  This may be a relatively 
easy task depending on the size of the subdivision and the requisite 
approval necessary.  Based on Clayton Terrace’s definition of “amend,” 
this would likely be a valid and enforceable restriction.161  The same can 
be done with a multitude of other issues facing subdivisions, such as 
fences, livestock, and other perceived “nuisance” activities.162 
Not only may this change in eighty years of precedent have 
significant implications for subdivision lot owners, but it may also lead to 
more cases involving amendments to residential subdivision indentures.  
 
 156. Jones v. Ladriere, 108 S.W.3d 736, 737–38 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003). 
 157. Clayton Terrace, 585 S.W.at 282. 
 158. See Airbnb Records 30% Growth Rate in First-Quarter on Booking Strength, 
REUTERS (Aug. 16, 2019 8:47 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-airbnb-
results/airbnb-records-30-growth-rate-in-first-quarter-on-booking-strength-source-
idUSKCN1V700L [https://perma.cc/Y9LF-BE5F]. Airbnb Inc. recorded $9.4 billion 
in total booking value in the first quarter of 2019, up 31% from the first quarter of 
2018. Id. This coming after the company reported 40% revenue growth in 2018 
compared with the previous year. Id. 
 159. Clayton Terrace, 585 S.W.3d at 282. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. For the purposes of this hypothetical, it is assumed the amendment 
provision contains similar language to those discussed in the aforementioned cases. 
 162. See id. 
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In other words, reducing the barriers to amending subdivision indentures 
paves the way for an increase in litigation involving attempts by 
homeowners’ associations to exact more control.  After Clayton Terrace, 
all that stands in the way of an overbearing neighbor mandating how you 
can and cannot use your property is the support of a requisite majority of 
lot owners, which may be as low as a simple majority, and the condition 
that the amendment be a “change or modif[ication] in any way for the 
better.”163  The Supreme Court of Missouri may soon have to consider 
what constitutes a change for the “better.”   
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Trustees of Clayton Terrace held that “amend” in the context of 
subdivision indentures does not imply that changes can only be less 
restrictive, but instead means “to change or modify in any way for the 
better.”164  In so holding, the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the 
standard established in Van Deusen that subdivision indentures and similar 
restrictive covenants could not be amended to add burdens without 
unanimous approval – a standard that has been applied by Missouri courts 
for more than eighty years.165  An amendment to subdivision indentures is 
now valid and enforceable if it garners the number of votes required by the 
terms of the indentures, regardless of whether the amendment adds a new 
restriction or eliminates an existing one.166  The Supreme Court of 
Missouri should not be surprised if its reversal of the “unanimous consent” 
requirement for increasing burdens on residential subdivision lot owners 
creates more problems for Missouri subdivisions and the property rights 
of lot owners than it seemed to envision.  The court may have overlooked 
that what is “better” for some, may not be “better” for others.  Just ask 6 
Clayton Terrace. 
 
 163. Id. (emphasis added). The term “requisite majority,” as used in this sentence, 
implies that the subdivision agreement allows for amendment by some form of a 
majority vote – a necessary condition for this proposition to be true. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 281–82 (citing Van Deusen v. Ruth, 125 S.W.2d 1, 3–4 (Mo. 1938)). 
 166. Id. at 282. 
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